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Abstract 
Laws are experienced, and produced, with and through bodies. By this, I mean the prohibitions, 
permissions, rights, and duties often understood as shaping the topology of a social community, amount 
to more than a system of rules incorporated in mental schema. Laws exist in dialectical relation with 
agents who construct, rely upon, and find meaning in law, and that dialectical relation is a consequence of 
both the representations agents impose upon social order and the material conditions of their 
environment that inform or otherwise give shape to their social practices. That environment, in which the 
legal actor is emplaced, includes both physical and social phenomena in actual space and the 
corporeality of the body. 
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Embodying Punishment: Emotions, 
Identities, and Lived Experiences 
in Women’s Prisons, by Anastasia 
Chamberlen1 
JOSHUA SHAW2 
LAWS ARE EXPERIENCED, AND PRODUCED, with and through bodies. By this, 
I mean the prohibitions, permissions, rights, and duties often understood as 
shaping the topology of a social community, amount to more than a system 
of rules incorporated in mental schema. Laws exist in dialectical relation with 
agents who construct, rely upon, and fnd meaning in law, and that dialectical 
relation is a consequence of both the representations agents impose upon social 
order and the material conditions of their environment that inform or otherwise 
give shape to their social practices. Tat environment, in which the legal actor is 
emplaced, includes both physical and social phenomena in actual space and the 
corporeality of the body. 
Since agents cannot shed their bodies, their representations and social 
practices are always mediated through their corporeality. In this way, the body is an 
integral part of the dialectical relations underlying the production and experience 
of law. Laws are the lived secretions of agents whose bodies are emplaced in 
a relational, social space. Laws are extensions of, and act upon, agents’ bodies, 
enacting a social order that assigns bodies proper places, experiences, and roles in 
1. (Oxford University Press, 2018). 













SHAW, EMBODYING PUNISHMENT 501 
the topology of the community. Te embodiment of law is thereby a crucial part 
to the study of law and society, in that the ways in which the body bears the efects 
of experiences and enacts law feshes out our theoretical and interdisciplinary 
understanding. Embodiment challenges perverse ideologies of liberal legal orders 
that deny laws’ corporeal core, and the phenomenological relations undergirding 
it, allowing us to grasp the contours of its material attachments to sociality and 
cognize alternate arrangements. 
Anastasia Chamberlen’s Embodying Punishment: Emotions, Identities, and 
Lived Experiences in Women’s Prisons, provides a helpful illustration of laws’ 
embodiment, particularly in the exceptional space of the prison. Chamberlen 
argues that embodiment3 is integral to understanding social phenomena generally, 
but that the prison is a site in which the body is preponderate over other features 
ordinarily salient to experience.4 In support of this thesis, Chamberlen describes 
the ways in which embodiment manifests in the space of the prison and the 
resulting expressions of self-identity among women prisoners. Critical themes 
Chamberlen addresses include: (1) how the body mediated the experience of 
the prison, particularly prisoners’ sense of autonomy and the experience of pain 
and resilience; (2) the contribution of the body to identity formation and ways 
the spatial organization of the prison were inscribed on prisoners’ bodies; and 
(3) how prisoners’ self-harm manifested as a creative response to the denial of 
autonomy within correctional space. Tese themes address the “somatic unity”5 
of prisoners’ social experience, in that “temporal, spatial, social, and afective 
dimensions of social environments”6 are lived through the body. 
I. AN EMBODIED SUBJECTIVITY 
Chamberlen principally relied upon “personal conversations [and] semi-structured 
interviews [with], and brief observations of the everyday lives of”7 twenty-four 
ex-prisoners in the United Kingdom. All of her participants identifed as women. 
Research participants were asked about their experience of prison, including their 
experience of their bodies within the prison. Participants were also asked about 
3. Chamberlen, supra note 1. Chamberlen defnes embodiment as “aspects of subjectivity 
as constituted and felt on the bodily level” and the body as “simultaneously object 
and subject” (ibid at 2). I think of embodiment—inclusive of law’s embodiment— 
similarly to Chamberlen. 
4. Ibid at 56-57, 191. 
5. Ibid at 4. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid at 199. 















their “background before imprisonment and their current lifestyles, essentially 
asking the participants to place their prison experience within their broader life 
narrative, by mapping crucial ‘moments’ in their lives.”8 Chamberlen characterized 
her questions as open-ended in that she invited participants’ testimonies about 
their “life-histor[ies],”9 not just their time in the prison and did not attempt to 
impose structure upon participants’ stories. Tis meant listening, uncritically, 
to participants, irrespective of irregularities in their accounts. Te life-history 
approach also encouraged participants to avoid relying upon logics disconnected 
from their experience, engaging in an “emotionally refexive discussion.”10 
Interviews were transcribed, coded qualitatively, and then synthesized 
to develop and ground Chamberlen’s theoretical description of the efects 
of the prison on prisoners’ embodiment. Chamberlen describes this as a case 
study method, in that the interviews and Chamberlen’s observations allowed 
her to construct theoretical accounts of “‘how’ and ‘why’ certain experiences 
or phenomena occur”11 from the “subjective stories of each participant.”12 
Importantly, Chamberlen was not attempting to construct an “objective” account 
of the prison, but instead relied upon the case study method to describe a plurality 
of subjective experiences of the prison. Te plurality of participant perspectives 
was, in part, relied upon to evaluate her theoretical interlocutors. Chamberlen 
also collated those experiences, allowing their synthesis and distinction to 
elucidate novel or unattended concepts that could account for the efects of the 
prison on prisoners in particular contexts. In her words, Chamberlen attempted 
to “create a cohesive story that expressed a clear picture of changing bodies in 
prison, as well as the changing identities of women as a result of imprisonment 
and other patriarchal pressures.”13 While intersubjective experience was the basis 
of theory building, Chamberlen leans into the subjectivity of the case study 
method, noting that theory must be open to the indeterminacy of social life and 
recurring correction.14 
Te method was also phenomenological, in the sense of understanding “that 
the body is not only our source of existence and connection with the world; 
it is also the vehicle through which we make sense of the world.”15 Chamberlen 
8. Ibid at 207. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid at 208. 
11. Ibid at 206. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid at 219. 
14. Ibid at 206. 
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attended to: (1) the participants’ bodies and their expressions or gestures; (2) 
her own body in relation to the participants and accounts of the prison; and 
(3) the “empathetic interconnection and non-verbal communication” between 
Chamberlen and the participants.16 Refexive observation of the somatic features 
of others and oneself were thereby important methodologically for Chamberlen 
to ensure that bodies formed part of the interpretive practice of research. 
In a description of her method, Chamberlen connected this embodied refexivity 
to Pierre Bourdieu, who was opposed to pure theory cleaved from experience, not 
only because it served her disciplinary and theoretical position, she also “found it 
essential to engage in this form ... because, on many occasions, [her] participants 
used [her] body as a comparative tool to express themselves.”17 Refexivity also 
allowed Chamberlen to attend to the ways in which her research participants’ 
experiences were refected in her body—a phantasmal efect of intercorporeality. 
In this way, there was a mimetic event experienced by both Chamberlen and the 
participants in conversation, which augmented the subjective accounts provided 
by situating the interview within a deeper sensory and perceptual experience. 
Tis facilitated communication by having a reference point and allowed 
Chamberlen to draw from her body to refne the interpretations reached. To this 
end, Chamberlen kept a diary and feld notes that documented her refections on 
her embodied experience. 
Although less central, Chamberlen also relied upon a drawing method to 
assist some participants with communicating during the interviews. Tis was 
not systematically used, but she reports that some participants ofered to draw 
to express concepts or experiences that were difcult to put into words. For 
example, a participant “drew a picture at the end of the interview depicting a 
female fgure with an amorphous and asymmetrical body constrained and barred 
within a box.”18 Alternatively, participants showed Chamberlen their scars or 
referred to songs to express themselves.19 Chamberlen does not explain how 
this information was specifcally incorporated into the theory-building, but it 
appears that she does not distinguish between it and other information. In this 
way, the open-ended approach to interviews was used to generate theory from 
the lived experiences of prisoners, irrespective of how that was communicated, 
suggesting that drawing and reference to other sensory experiences could assist in 
the study of embodiment. 
16. Ibid at 219. 
17. Ibid at 217. 
18. Ibid at 177. 
19. Ibid. 










Altogether, the combination of interview, observation, and drawing methods 
is shaped by a feminist methodology. Chamberlen relies upon a feminist 
methodology in that her subject matter is a gendered experience of social 
phenomena. Her feminist methodology also attends to the ways in which power is 
diferentially structured between the researcher and research participants, assumes 
a self-critical perspective entailing ongoing introspection and revision, and takes 
the lived experiences of its subjects seriously in the construction of theory.20 
Chamberlen also notes that a feminist methodology is one that is concerned with 
the positionality of the researcher, drawing from their lived experience in the 
course of research and in their interpretation of results.21 As a result, Chamberlen’s 
feminist methodology is “politically conscious,”22 seeking to identify and 
intervene in structures that produce and reproduce gender inequality. A feminist 
methodology, then, is an approach to planning, synthesizing, and fnding 
meaning within research that gives efect to a politically conscious project of 
emancipating society from relations of violence and domination exacted by men: 
a structure salient to the experience of women in prisons. 
II. THE SOMATIC UNITY 
Chamberlen challenges the idea of the prison as merely a machine of confnement. 
Instead, she considers the “prison as a fuid, leaky phenomenon, and an 
institutional practice that incorporates more than confnement within the walls of 
a specifc establishment.”23 Prisoners are imbedded in a carceral mesh, to borrow 
from Loïc Wacquant,24 that is continuous with sociality external to the prison’s 
built environment. Te built prison is indeed porous, in the sense that it is part of 
a broader socio-spatial system that ceaselessly mediates prisoners’ experience and 
self-understanding. Correctional staf, visitors, and artefacts of media exchange 
norms with prisoners, always tethering them dialectically to spaces outside the 
prison’s walls. Te prison also forms part of a time-space assemblage, in that the 
prisoner does not come to the prison denuded of prior, embodied experience, 
allowing prisoners to bring experiences that afect their encounters with the 
prison and the encounters of others. Further, the constellation of spatializations at 
20. Ibid at 219. 
21. Ibid at 190, 217-18. 
22. Ibid at 220. 
23. Ibid at 1. 
24. See “Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh” (2001) 3 
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work in the prison do not end upon release—the efects of the prison are retained 
through embodiment, and homologous structures and practices external to the 
built prison re-inscribe those efects. In this way, prisoners form part of a dynamic 
temporal and spatial order irrespective of their confnement, which continuously 
shapes and reshapes their relations to their bodies. Although Chamberlen does 
not use the terminology of “assemblage,” I believe her use of descriptors “leaky” 
and “fuid” indicate she would agree that the prison, and prisoners, forms part of 
an assemblage that extends across space and time. 
Te prison’s dynamism was demonstrated in the interviews with the 
prisoners who referred to changes in their bodies across their life-course to bring 
their “bodies and identities” into focus.25 Prisoners also reported hypervigilance 
with respect to their bodies because the socio-spatial organization of the prison 
marked a signifcant transformation in experience. Prisoners often came to prison 
with substance dependence suddenly cut of during incarceration, or in states 
of nutritional deprivation satiated by routine provision of food, resulting in 
changes that heightened awareness of their bodies. For example, some prisoners 
reported experiencing menstruation after a prolonged absence because of 
relatively nutritious food and distance from drugs within the prison.26 Prisons 
also deprived prisoners of activities and mobility, and introduced unending and 
loud noise, which focused prisoners’ attention on their embodied responses 
within the prison. Some prisoners said they felt desirable for the frst time in 
a long while, but greater awareness of one’s body was not altogether a positive 
experience.27 Chamberlen argues that the “prison refocuses the attention of 
women on their bodies, and invites the prisoner to start thinking of herself 
and lifestyle in embodied ways,” but the “medicalizing focus, and paradoxical 
combination of care and punishment in custody, combine[d] to exacerbate [a] 
painful experience.”28 Tis produced ambivalent, at best, or harmful experiences 
of the body, in that prisoners were constantly reminded of “their spatial and 
temporal regulation and incapacitation, [and] of the pathologization of their 
bodies.”29 Further, the “perpetual changeability”30 of the body within the prison, 
prevented self-control in the sense of forming boundaries to defne one’s self 
in relation to others. Chamberlen relied upon Drew Leder’s concept of the 
25. Chamberlen, supra note 1 at 58. 
26. Ibid at 67-70. 
27. Ibid at 84-86. 
28. Ibid at 91-92. 
29. Ibid at 99. 
30. Ibid at 100. 














“dys-appearing body” to explain the paradoxical efect of a body conspicuously 
felt within the prison—or what Chamberlen refers to as “regained awareness”— 
whilst simultaneously losing agency to alienation.31 
Chamberlen concludes the book with a description of how self-harm is 
demonstrative of prisoners’ embodiment of the punishment-body relation;32 
the punishment-body relation is understood as the body’s dialectical relation, 
materially and discursively, to the prison environment. In particular, Chamberlen 
attends to how pain—pain of self-harm and of punishment—intersect and afect 
prisoner’s experience.33 Numerous research participants reported experiences of 
self-harm, mediated through and borne by their bodies, as a means of coping 
with imprisonment or agency. Chamberlen argued that self-harm was “embodied 
emotion work that simultaneously give[s] meaning to and express[es] the self via 
the body.”34 It was a “therapeutic practice of self-healing and self-construction, 
insofar as it [was] an efort to alleviate pain and preserve a sense of self.”35 Prisoners 
were reminded of their corporeal existence through self-harm, which reafrmed 
and produced a claim to autonomy for prisoners despite the denial of autonomy 
by the spatial organization of the prison itself. It is here that some prisoners 
ofered to draw, or show their scars, to express their feelings, overcoming the 
incommunicability of such an experience.36 
Altogether, studying the embodiment of punishment necessitated a study 
of the somatic unity of prisoners’ experience, in the sense that the “temporal, 
spatial, social, and afective dimensions of [the prison’s] social environment….”37 
had to be understood as concurrent processes lived through, and inscribed upon, 
prisoners’ bodies. Te combination of interviews, observation, and drawing 
allowed Chamberlen to engage refexively with that somatic unity as an emergent 
property or object of analysis with respect to each prisoner’s subjectivity and 
translate the summation of those experiences into a theoretical account of 
punishment. Tat account acknowledged the inseparability of the body from 
social experience, and the context-specifc ways in which the prison’s organization 
acted upon, and was inscribed within, prisoners’ bodies. 
31. Ibid at 61. 
32. Ibid at 175. 
33. Ibid at 169-71. 
34. Ibid at 175. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid at 177. 
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III. THE PLACE OF LAW 
Te prison in Embodying Punishment appears as a lawless space; not in the 
sense that illegality pervades the prison, but rather in the lack of reference to 
law. Chamberlen is a criminologist whose principal interest, in this project at 
least, was studying prisoners’ subjectivity in the prison as a space and as an 
institution of social practices. Given this disciplinary focus, it is unfair to expect 
a discussion of law. But from the perspective of law and society scholars, I believe 
it is important to refect upon Chamberlen’s intervention in the prison as an 
example of how legal consciousness and experience can be studied through a 
phenomenological method as an embodied social fact. By understanding that 
implicit to Chamberlen’s study, one’s placement, condition of treatment and 
punishment, and potential release in or from prison, among other things, are in 
part the product of laws, I think a law and society scholar should be able to sense 
its methodological utility in studying law. It is from this perspective that I think 
Embodying Punishment is a helpful illustration of laws’ embodiment, irrespective 
of whether Chamberlen specifcally raises the question of law in her analysis. 
For example, when Chamberlen discusses the disempowerment caused 
by the “prison’s refusal to allow women to exercise decision-making over their 
treatment,” she is implicitly referring to the legal complex within English prisons 
that conveys especial authority to prison physicians to determine the course of 
medical treatment.38 Te legal complex is heterogeneous, formed from disparate 
processes and powers, which, taken together, have an emergent efect on prisoners’ 
embodiment. Elsewhere, James Woodall, Rachael Dixey, and Jane South describe 
the systematic depredation of prisoners’ autonomy in prison health care settings 
where “the structured nature of the regime situated individuals in a routine that 
relentlessly resulted in feelings of monotony and boredom” and the loss of a sense 
of control.39 Chamberlen reaches a similar conclusion, and goes further, stating 
that “women are frstly stripped of their individuality and self-control as prisoners 
and secondly as patients.”40 For many prisoners, due to social marginality, the 
prison is often the frst time health services are easily accessible and many undergo 
changes in their bodies that can demarcate health and pain (e.g., withdrawal 
from substances, taking up substances, incidence of menstruation). Chamberlen’s 
38. Ibid at 96. 
39. “Control and Choice in English Prisoners: Developing Health-Promoting Prisoners” (2013) 
29 Health Promotion Intl 474 at 477. 
40. Chamberlen, supra note 1 at 96. 









interview participants reported that they, and others, often came to be reliant 
upon medical intervention as they experienced these bodily changes. 
Prison physicians and their health teams were described as contributing to 
this reliance with the administration of methadone, which was often to prisoners’ 
an “overall rehabilitative disadvantage in order to keep them quiet and thus 
manageable in the prison environment.”41 Te depredation of autonomy and 
reliance of prisoners on health care interventions operates alongside permissions 
that establish that English prisoners can only obtain treatment approved by prison 
physicians, and that mental illness provides maximal authority to administer 
treatment as physicians assess is needed. Te prison setting can thereby be 
understood as producing a space of “slow death,”42 to borrow a term from 
necropolitics, in that health care is administered in a way that “constitute[s] the 
prisoner’s docile and quietened body” in an enactment of “forced compliance” 
that constrains their social plasticity.43 Tis not only leads to the compelling 
account of how prison, as an architectural and institutional space, regulates the 
experience and expression of the body, but also suggests for me how sociolegal 
practices enact law in the prison and their connection to embodiment. 
A law and society scholar might rely upon a similar case study, with a 
similar set of qualitative and phenomenological methodologies, whilst attending 
to the specifc contribution of the legal form to the production of prisoners’ 
embodiment. I suspect that would require additional questions that specifcally 
attempt to apprehend prisoners’ lived experience of the processes, powers, and 
permissions of law, as those are enacted in the sociolegal practices of correctional 
staf and prisoners. It might also require a theory of law, which can conceptualize 
the legal form, its production, and its efects on and meaning for social actors. 
But these are simple reconfgurations of the general methodological project 
demonstrated by Chamberlen. Te corporeality of law is not distant from the 
corporeality of space or institutions—indeed, as we consider their shared basis 
in social phenomena, like in the exceptional space of the prison, we come to 
realize our materiality is imbricated in law, space, and institutions. Chamberlen 
may not have spotlighted law’s constituent part in the picture, but law was latent 
in Embodying Punishment and awaits elaboration by law and society scholars 
determined to take seriously the embodied experience of law. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Billy-Ray Belcourt, “Meditations on Reserve Life, Biosociality, and the Taste of 
Non-Sovereignty” (2018) 8 Settler Colonial Stud 1 at 4. 
43. Chamberlen, supra note 1 at 96. 
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To that end, elaborating upon Chamberlen’s work, law and society scholars 
should embrace research as an embodied fact. By saying this, I mean that the 
researcher should apprehend senses that arise in encounters with the participant 
through intersubjective corporeality. Since the law and society scholar, like the 
participant, is not disembodied, relevant senses might indeed arise from the 
researcher’s body. Tis is a signifcant part of the phenomenological method, 
in that the lived experience of talking to, interviewing, or observing someone else 
may allow the law and society researcher to refect on their own bodies and learn 
about the nomoi we inhabit. Diarizing the hot fashes, butterfies, and excrement 
of our bodies in encounters with others is a meaningful part to describing the 
dialectical relation of law to our bodies. From there law and society scholars can 
construct theories of law that are felt, accepting laws’ corporeal core. 
